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Abstract
In June 2017, the fifth and so far last of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) were un-
able to agree on a consensus report that would have brought additional clarity to how international
law regulates cyberspace. The article discusses why the UN GGE process seemed to have now
reached a dead-end. It argues that the discussion about how Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) should be regulated is as much about strategy, politics and ideological differen-
ces as it is about law. For the time being, states have too diverging interests and normative prefer-
ences for consensus on anything but the most basic of legal findings to arise. The article also offers
some suggestions about what the future holds with regard to the regulation of cyberspace. It
argues that the collapse of the UN GGE process is likely to lead to a shift away from ambitious glo-
bal initiatives and towards regional agreements between “like-minded states”. In turn, we may
well see the gradual emergence of a fragmented international normative structure for ICT. It is also
likely that nonstate actors will begin to play a more central role in the efforts to bring legal clarity to
the governance of ICT.
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Introduction
As our societies become ever more dependent on information and
communication technology (ICT), ensuring international agreement
on what is proper and what is not proper behavior in cyberspace has
become one of the most important policy issues of our time. In fact,
since the digital world has increasingly become a scene of confronta-
tion and potential conflict among states, norms – both formal and
informal – appears to now be the preferred regulatory course for
seeking to create stability and safety in cyberspace [1]. In an anarchi-
cal cyberspace without “rules of the road” and shared expectations
of behavior, stronger states will be free to impose their will on
weaker states and minor incidents may escalate and spin out of
control.
Since the challenges of ICT was first brought to the attention of
the UN General Assembly in the late 1990s, the so-called “UN GGE
process” has been the primary avenue for interstate dialogue about
the international legal regulation of cyberspace.1 To use the well-
known terminology of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, for
purposes of international law, the UN GGE framework has been the
main “organizational platform” for states seeking to act as
1 Cyber security is discussed in a range of international fora, including in
different UN fora. Reference should also be made to the two-phased UN
sponsored World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) held in
Geneva in 2003 and in Tunis in 2005. In December 2015, a High-Level
meeting of the General Assembly was organized to review the implemen-
tation of the documents that had been produced in the course of the
WSIS process. For an overview of the various organizational “cyber-
platforms” at the UN, see Maurer T. Cyber Norm Emergence at the
United Nations – An Analysis of the Activities at the UN Regarding
Cyber-Security, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard Kennedy School, September 2011. https://www.belfercenter.org
/publication/cyber-norm-emergence-united-nations-analysis-uns-activities-
regarding-cyber-security (20 November 2018, date last accessed). See
also the overview in Nye JS Jr, The Regime Complex for Managing
Global Cyber Activities, Global Commission on Internet Governance,
Paper Series 2013, 1. https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_
paper_no1.pdf (20 November 2018, date last accessed).
VC The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press. 1
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“norm entrepreneurs” in cyberspace [2]. Here, “Groups of
Governmental Experts” (GGE) (assisted by the UN’s Office for
Disarmament Affairs) set up by the UN Secretary General to
study the “Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” have
discussed how best to approach the many challenges the new tech-
nologies raise. While the process was off to a slow start and the first
group of experts was not able to reach agreement on a consensus re-
port, subsequent groups were more successful and over the course of
the next decade agreement was reached on a range of noteworthy
findings. Among other things, it became clear that everyone agreed
that cyberspace is not an unregulated space, where states are free to
behave as they please. Rather, as a point of departure at least, it is
governed by the same international legal principles that govern the
“physical” spaces. But the question of “how exactly” those princi-
ples apply to ICT proved much harder to answer. And in June 2017,
the fifth and so far final group of governmental experts realized that
they had reached a dead-end and could not agree on another report
that would have brought additional clarity on the application of
international law to cyberspace.
The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, it will explore why
the fifth and so far last UN GGE failed. Why was it not possible for
states to bring additional legal clarity to how international law
applies in cyberspace? Secondly, the article will try to predict what
the future has in store vis-a`-vis the regulation of ICT. How will
states now try to bring legal clarity to cyberspace? What will be the
main processes and actors?
The article argues that the breakdown of the UN GGE pro-
cess was actually fairly predictable [3]. After all, despite what
many international lawyers seem to believe, the discussion about
how ICT should be regulated is as much about strategy, politics
and ideological differences (if not more so) than it is about law.
And at present, states’ interests and normative preferences are
simply too diverse for consensus on anything but the most basic
of such issues to arise. The article also argues that we should
not expect cyberspace to be regulated by a uniform international
legal regime anytime soon. The frustrated UN GGE process
reflects how difficult it has become for states to agree on some
of the most important issues of our time and it is likely to lead
to a shift away from ambitious global initiatives and towards re-
gional agreements between “like-minded states”. Thus, we may
well see the gradual emergence of a fragmented international
normative structure for ICT. The article also predicts that non-
state actors will begin to take a more central rule in the efforts
to bring legal clarity to the governance of ICT.
Since the issue of norms – both informal and formal – feature
prominently in the debate about cyber governance,2 it is worth not-
ing that the present article focuses on the formal norms that one
finds in the sphere of international law.
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the UN GGE process as well as its most important legal findings.
Section 3 explains why the process came to a dead-end by situating
the debate about the regulation of cyberspace in a wider strategic
and ideological context. Section 4 offers some thoughts about where
the efforts to regulate cyberspace will go now before Section 5 offers
a brief conclusion.
The UN GGE process
The UN GGE process up until the collapse of the fifth
group of experts
The rapid developments in information and communication technol-
ogy (ICT) was first brought to the attention of one of the main
organs in the United Nations in 1998, when Russia introduced a
draft resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly.
The resolution – adopted without a vote – noted how new technolo-
gies could be used in a destabilizing fashion and therefore affect the
security of States. It also invited Member States to inform the
Secretary-General of their views on, inter alia, the “advisability” of
developing international principles to enhance the security of global
ICT systems and to assist in fighting information terrorism and
criminality (A/Res/53/70 (1999)). In the following years, Russia
introduced more or less similar draft proposals (A/Res/54/49 (1999);
A/Res/55/28 (2000); A/Res/56/19 (2001)) and in January 2002, the
General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to establish a group
of governmental experts to report on international concepts for
“strengthening the security of global information and telecommuni-
cations systems” (A/Res.56/19 (2002)). This first group of experts –
officially titled the “United Nations Group of Governmental
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security”
(more commonly referred to as the “Group of Governmental
Experts” or “UN GGE”) – consisted of 15 members selected on the
basis of an equitable geographical distribution. While it was the am-
bition of this first group of experts to submit a consensus report that
goal turned out to be too optimistic and a final report was never
adopted.
The failure of the first GGE did not dissuade the UN and its
Member States, however, and by the end of 2005, the Secretary-
General set-up a second group of experts to continue the study of
ICT threats and possible cooperative measures (Res. A/60/45
(2005)). When the group of experts met in 2009, the 2007
cyberattacks on Estonia and Russia’s campaign of cyber-activities in
its 2008 conflict with Georgia had heightened awareness among
states about the risk of conflict in cyberspace. The Estonian attacks
also illustrated how the absence of international agreement on the
most basic governing principles in cyberspace increased the risk that
a cyber-incident – whether intended or not – could potentially spiral
out of control and lead to a damaging conflict. Unlike the first group
of experts, this second group managed to reach agreement on a short
2010 consensus report with a set of very rudimentary findings and
recommendations (A/Res/65/2001 (2010)). The report noted how
states were developing ICTs as “instruments of warfare and intelli-
gence, and for political purposes” and it stipulated how uncertain-
ties about attribution and the absence of common understanding
about acceptable behaviour created a risk of instability and misper-
ception. As for the regulation of cyberspace, the report merely noted
that norms could be developed over time in order to supplement
existing norms and that further dialogue was needed. Procedurally,
the report was dealt with in the First Committee’s next periodic
meeting in the fall of 2010. As other reports adopted by consensus,
it was interpreted as reflecting unanimity.
Although the 2010 report did not bring much legal clarity, the
mere fact that the experts were able to agree on a report was consid-
ered a positive sign and a cause for optimism. Thus, in December
2 “Norms” are usually understood to be widely accepted ways of behaving
among members of a certain group. Norms may take many forms and
there are different ways of classifying norms. One can distinguish, for ex-
ample, between cultural and social norms, and informal and formal
norms. It is within the group of formal norms we find those accepted
ways of behavior that have been created in law-making processes – either
domestically or internationally – and thus take the form of law.
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2011, the General Assembly set up a third group of experts and this
time the group was specifically asked to discuss “norms, rules or
principles of responsible behaviour of States” (A/Res/66/24 (2011)).
By then, the 2010 Stuxnet-attack on the Iranian nuclear program
had uncovered what a targeted covert cyber-operation could accom-
plish. In 2009, at the initiative of the NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) in Tallinn
(Estonia), a working group of independent (Western) legal experts
had also begun drafting what would later become known as the first
Tallinn Manual on the international law governing cyber warfare.
In June 2013, the third UN GGE submitted a consensus report
stressing how common “understandings on norms, rules and princi-
ples applicable to the use of ICTs” can help advance peace and se-
curity (A/Res/68/98 (2013)). More substantively, the report noted
that international law and in particular the Charter of the United
Nations, as well as the principles of state sovereignty apply to state
conduct of ICT-related activities, and to their jurisdiction over ICT
infrastructure within their territories. While vague and rudimentary,
these findings reflected an emerging consensus that cyberspace is
subject to the same general principles of international law that gov-
ern the more physical domains. As we return to later, this had been
the official position of the United States since 2011, when it pre-
sented its International Strategy for Cyberspace. Other states had
been more hesitant and China in particular, had consistently stressed
how difficult it is to apply international law to ICT [4]. A few
months prior to the publication of the 2013 report, the international
working group of academic experts set up by NATO to draft a man-
ual for cyber warfare published the “Tallinn Manual on the
International Law applicable to Cyber Warfare” – also known as
the first Tallinn manual. Here, the experts had unanimously con-
cluded that the general principles in international law for governing
the resort to the use of force (jus ad bellum) and the legal principles
governing the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello) apply to cyber
operations and that the relevant issue is not “if” but instead “how”
such law applies [5]. One more finding in the 2013 report is worth
mentioning. The group of experts agreed that human rights and fun-
damental freedoms apply in ICT. Later in the same year, the
General Assembly adopted a resolution on “the right to privacy in
the digital age” that recognized the “global and open nature of the
Internet” and how “the same rights that people have offline must
also be protected online” (A/Res/68/167 (2013)).
In December 2013, a fourth group of governmental experts was
created (A/Res/68/243, 2013)) and in July 2015 the group submitted
a consensus report that elaborated on some of the findings in the
two previous GGE reports. The report explicitly referred to the UN
resolutions on the right to privacy in the digital age and offered a list
of nonexhaustive views on how international law applies to the use
of ICTs by States. Among other things, the experts noted that states
have jurisdiction over the ICT infrastructure located within their ter-
ritory; that they must observe the principles of sovereignty, sover-
eign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and
nonintervention in the internal affairs of other States. The report
also stated that existing obligations under international law are ap-
plicable to state uses of ICTs, and that states must comply with their
obligations under international law to respect and protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms. With regard to the UN Charter,
the experts affirmed that it “applies in its entirety” and noted “the
inherent right of States to take measures consistent with internation-
al law and as recognized in the Charter”. The report also stated,
however, that there was a “need for further study on this matter”.
Other noticeable points in the report included its reference to “the
principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality and distinction”
and the obligation on states not to “use proxies to commit inter-
nationally wrongful acts using ICTs” and to “ensure that their terri-
tory is not used by non-State actors to commit such acts” (A/Res/70/
174, 2015)).. The 2015 report was able to keep the interstate con-
version on the regulation of cyberspace on track but the discussions
had not been easy and a number of important issues were notably
absent from the consensus report. Most importantly, despite the
vague reference to “the principles of humanity, necessity, propor-
tionality and distinction” cited above, the report did not explicitly
state that international humanitarian law potentially applies to
cyber-activities.
The fifth and final group of experts
In December 2015, a fifth Group of Experts was created with the
hope – among Western states in particular – that yet another round
of expert discussions could add clarity to the regulation of cyber-
space (A/Res/70/237, 2015)). This time, however, the discussions
proved much more difficult and in June 2017, the experts failed to
agree on a draft for a consensus report. It appears to have been
Cuba and apparently also China and Russia that decided not to ac-
cept the draft. Officially, at least, the problem seems to be explicit
references in the draft report to the potential applicability of the
right to self-defence, the general international law principles of
countermeasures and international humanitarian law. In a statement
issued after the unsuccessful discussions were concluded, the Cuban
representative stated that he was concerned with “the pretension of
some . . . to convert cyberspace into a theater of military operations
and to legitimize, in that context, unilateral punitive force actions,
including the application of sanctions and even military action by
States claiming to be victims of illicit uses of ICTs”. He objected to
statements in the draft report that in his mind sought to “establish
equivalence between the malicious use of ICTs and the concept of
“armed attack . . . which attempts to justify the alleged applicability
in this context of the right to self-defense”. Allegedly, this consti-
tuted a “fatal blow to the collective security and peacekeeping archi-
tecture established in the Charter of the United Nations”, essentially
turning the field into a “Law of the Jungle”, in “which the interests
of the most powerful States would always prevail to the detriment
of the most vulnerable”. The Cuban representative also highlighted
the draft report’s references to the law of armed conflict because it
“would legitimize a scenario of war and military actions in the con-
text of ICT” [6].
Cuba’s official objection to the potential application of the right
to self-defense and countermeasures to activities in cyberspace is dif-
ficult to accept [7]. After all, as noted above, previous reports had
stated that the Charter applies to activities in the ICT environment.
The 2015 report explicitly referred to “the inherent right of States to
take measures consistent with international law and as recognized in
the Charter” and the right to self-defense is, of course, an integral
part of the Charter. References to the right to self-defense and the
principles of countermeasures in relation to hostile acts in cyber-
space are also found in a November 2015 declaration by the G20
[8] and in an April 2017 declaration by the G7 [9]. In the academic
literature, the claim that cyber activities may – if sufficiently grave
and serious – trigger a right to self-defense or to countermeasures is
far from controversial [5, 10].
On the surface, at least, the reluctance by states like Cuba and
China to accept that international humanitarian law may apply to
activities in cyberspace is less surprising. As already noted, there
were no explicit references to humanitarian law in the GGE’s 2015
report and that was not a coincidence. As we shall return to below,
Journal of Cybersecurity, 2019, Vol. 5, No. 1 3
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in its official statements about how to regulate cyberspace, China
has sought to adopt a pacifist view and frequently voiced its alleged
concern about the application of the “military paradigm” to
cyberattacks. China has stated that there is a risk that this will ag-
gravate “the arms race and militarization in cyberspace”. Thus,
China’s official stance is that the “application of existing laws of
armed conflict to cyberspace requires further scrutiny” [11, 12].
Regardless of why China has decided to publicly voice its con-
cern about an undue “militarization” of cyberspace, such a concern
is not totally unwarranted. After all, many states have integrated
their new cyber-capabilities – at times termed “cyber commands” –
into the military chain of command. In addition, as noted elsewhere,
even though no one has yet (by November 2018) been killed or even
injured in a cyberattack, the debate about ICT security and cyber
threats has been dominated by worst-case scenarios of “cyber-
armageddons”, “cyber Pearl Harbors” and airplanes falling from
the sky.3 The preoccupation with catastrophic cyberattacks against
critical infrastructure may well have deflected attention away from
what should be of most concern to at least Western states: so-called
“below the use of force threshold” operations that consist of various
forms of espionage, manipulation of data, criminal activities and dif-
ferent and novel forms of coercion that cause little physical
destruction [13].
This, however, should not lead one to rule out the possibility
that international humanitarian law could become of relevance to
activities in cyberspace. This also appears to be the position of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In a November
2017 statement to the United Nations, the ICRC stated that “there
is no question that IHL applies to and restricts the use of cyber capa-
bilities as means and methods of warfare during armed conflicts”.
The ICRC also stressed that by “asserting that IHL applies to cyber
operations, the ICRC is in no way condoning cyber warfare, nor is it
condoning the militarization of cyberspace” [14]. Indeed, as we shall
return to in the following section, it may very well be that a state
like China’s reluctance to accept the potential applicability of inter-
national humanitarian law to harmful cyber-activities has more to
do with longer term strategic calculations and a desire to slow the
pace of reaching international consensus than bona fide interpreta-
tions of international law.
The strategic and ideological context
surrounding cyber security
The link between law and strategy
To understand why the overall consensus that international law
applies to ICT has yet to materialize into agreement among states on
the concrete application of particular legal principles, one must take
account of the wider strategic and ideological context. The debate
about how international law applies to cyberspace is not merely an
academic exercise in legal interpretation but also – if not primarily –
about trying to reconcile colliding strategic interests and clashing
ideological worldviews [3].4 For all manners and purposes, the out-
come of the debate will determine how states can use modern ICT to
further their political agendas, including their foreign policy goals.
The discussion is, in other words, to a large extent about how the
traditional concepts and tools of statecraft should be applied to the
present and future digital age [15]. This, of course, has not been lost
on the states, and the major states in particular are actively seeking
to promote those norms and legal interpretations they believe will
serve their long-term strategic interests.5
We have already seen how the Chinese seek to use international
law and legal interpretation as a way to prevent the potential appli-
cation of international humanitarian law to cyber-activities. China
traditionally adopts a restrictive position on the legality of using
force and it would be natural if it utilized legal interpretations to try
to counterbalance American posture in cyberspace [4]. In the cyber
security debate, China’s traditional support for the UN is reflected
in the fact that the Chinese would like the UN to take the leading
role in developing consensus on the regulation of ICT. Beijing has
therefore been very critical of the Tallinn Manual process that it
considers an American NATO effort to maintain US dominance in
the information age. To some extent, at least, Russia is a Chinese
“ally” when it comes to using international law to counter
American dominance of ICT. Moscow worries about the prospects
of a “cyber arms race” and it has therefore tried to push for an inter-
national agreement modeled on earlier arms control agreements [16,
17]. To Russia, such an agreement may help “level the playing
field”. Thus, when Russia brought the issue of ICT to the UN, it
introduced its resolution in the General Assembly’s First Committee
on Disarmament and International Security. While Russia acknowl-
edges that international law applies to ICT, it also argues that new
laws and institutions are required to ensure long-term stability.
The most dominant power in cyberspace is, of course, the USA.
The Americans rely on international law to maintain their superior
position and to prevent other states from engaging in what it per-
ceives to be disruptive activities. To the USA, the promotion of
cyber-norms is a way to create predictability and to deter hostile
cyber-acts [18]. From the beginning, the USA has consistently
sought to resist the creation of new legal constraints – such as those
proposed by the Chinese and the Russians – that would limit
American cyber capabilities. Thus, it has (so far) managed to steer
away from any serious talks about adopting new treaties or new
standards for regulating cyberspace. As noted previously, the
American position is that cyberspace should be regulated by
the existing legal principles. This was reflected in the US reaction to
the failure of the fifth UN GGE to agree on another consensus re-
port, where, after the negotiations, the American representative reit-
erated the US view that the task of the GGE was not to discuss “if”
international law applies to the use of ICTs’, but merely “how”
[19].. This is also the position of the UK [20].
The USA has also been very active in seeking to counter indus-
trial espionage and the theft of intellectual property. For example,
while the Russians as noted earlier introduced their resolutions on
ICT in the GA’s First Committee on Disarmament and International
Security, the Americans instead introduces its resolutions in the
Second Committee on Economic and Financial issues and the Third
Committee on Social, Cultural and Humanitarian affairs. The USA
has also worked tirelessly to persuade China to accept a norm
3 For a provocative view, see Rid, T. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. New
York.: Oxford University Press, 2014; A classic example of a fairly
alarmist view is offered in Clarke, R, Knake, R.K. Cyber War: The Next
Threat to National Security and What To Do About It. New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 2010.
4 It should be noted that the lack of disagreement may also reflect a split
between developed and developing states over the issue of some sort of
technology transfer and assistance with regard to building cyber capabil-
ities, see Nye (n 21), p. 7-–8.
5 For an overview of states’ approaches, see Global Commission on the
Stability of Cyber Space (GCSC), Briefings from the Research Advisory
Group, New Delhi, India, November 2017. https://cyberstability.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/GCSC-Briefings-from-the-Research-Advisory-
Group_New-Delhi-2017.pdf (11 September 2018, date last accessed).
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prohibiting economic espionage and in September 2015 the
American efforts paid off when President Obama signed an agree-
ment on commercial espionage with Chinese president Jinping [21].
In addition, the US government has brought criminal indictments
against Chinese nationals suspected of engaging in cyber espionage
activities deemed harmful to the USA.
The strategic dimension of the legal debate is reflected in the re-
luctance by some states to publicly state their positions on the regu-
lation of cyberspace. Some states appear to believe that it is not – at
present at least – in their strategic interests to be very active partici-
pants in the creation of a very detailed regulation of ICT. This could
either be because they want to see where the technology is going be-
fore they form their legal opinions or – more cynically – because
they think it is in their interest to stall progress and maintain the
existing legal uncertainties. After all, legal ambiguity may allow for
more flexibility. There would, for example, appear to be an element
of this form of “fence sitting” to the Chinese approach to the regula-
tion of cyberspace.
In reaction to the June 2017 UN GGE disappointment, the
American representative noted that the US had come to the
“unfortunate conclusion that those who are unwilling to affirm
the applicability of these international legal rules and principles be-
lieve their states are free to act in or through cyberspace to achieve
their political ends with no limit on their actions” and that this is “a
dangerous and unsupportable view” [19]. Although the US represen-
tative did not name states like China and Russia, the insinuation
was quite clear. Frustration with what appears to be intentional ob-
struction by at least certain states was also noticeable in remarks
delivered in the First Committee’s discussions of the lack of a fifth
UN GGE consensus report in October 2017 by the German
Representative [22].
In practice, of course, the strategic approaches adopted by states
to the discussion of how cyberspace is or ought to be regulated
under international law coincide with their respective ICT strengths
and weaknesses. This is not surprising, and Professor Matthew
Waxman has illustrated how, for example, less powerful states al-
ways try to use norms and legal interpretations to try to “level the
playing field” [23]. We should therefore only expect that states
with powerful offensive cyber capabilities and correspondingly low
vulnerabilities to cyberattacks will try to push for a regulation that
differs from what will be advanced by states with comparatively lim-
ited capabilities and high vulnerabilities. In addition, as noted
above, since Western states, like the USA, are particularly vulnerable
to industrial espionage they have been very active in pushing for
legal bans on such forms of activities.
The regulation of cyberspace and ideological
differences about internet openness
Some of the obstacles to reaching common ground on how to regu-
late ICT stems from fundamentally different ideological attitudes to-
wards Internet openness and fundamental freedoms. Simply put,
states disagree about whether the free flow of information in cyber-
space is primarily a “good” that is worth protecting or if it is mainly
a threat that must be curbed. In the West, of course, cyberspace is
considered an important tool for spreading – and at times even
securing – human rights, such as the freedom of expression. To
Western states, the debate about how to regulate ICT concerns
“cyber security” and identifying the right way to include participa-
tion from the many different actors who has a stake in the peaceful
use of cyberspace. In other parts of the world, however, notions of
Internet freedom is greeted with much less enthusiasm. In places like
Russia, China and in many states in the Middle East, an open cyber-
space is (rightly) considered a threat to existing governing structures
[17]. Here, the debate is not framed as one about “cyber security”
but instead about “information security” centered around state sov-
ereignty. As Christopher A. Ford has noted, one simply cannot di-
vorce Russia and China’s proposals to ban or regulate cyber
weapons from their desire to maintain domestic political control
over information. The fears harbored by these states about
cyberattacks are inseparable from their deeper concern about polit-
ical subversions that may be associated with the free flow of
information [17]. In China, the concern about freedom of informa-
tion has led to the creation of the so-called “Great Firewall of
China”, which essentially seeks to cut off the Chinese part of the
Internet from the rest of the system.
The ideological differences were on clear display at the
International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) World Conference
on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in Dubai (UAE) in
2012. Here, many Western states refused to sign treaty amendments
to the 1988 International Telecommunications Regulations due to
concerns that the new provisions would give governments to great a
role in governing cyberspace [24]. Some of the “government friendly
states” push their ideological views through the so-called Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) that is composed of China,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In
September 2011, the SCO submitted an International Code of
Conduct for Information Security to the UN Secretary-General.
Among the noticeable elements of the Code is the statement that
states refrain from using information and communication networks
“to interfere in the internal affairs of other States or with the aim of
undermining their political, economic and social stability”. The
Code also stresses how states must ensure that other states cannot
exploit a dominant position within ICT “to undermine States’ right
to independent control of information and communications technol-
ogy goods and services, or to threaten their political, economic and
social security”. The Code refers to the right to “seek, receive and
impart information” but it also states how it may be necessary to
make “certain restrictions” in order to ensure “respect of the rights
or reputations of others” and for “the protection of national security
or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals”
(SCO Code of Conduct, 2011).6
It should be noted that states do not always fit neatly into the dif-
ferent categories of having either “strong” or “weak” cyber-
capabilities or of being either “pro-Internet freedom” or “anti-
Internet freedom”. Often, a state has multiple “identities” [1]. For
instance, on the surface at least, the Snowden revelations illustrate
that ideological disagreements about privacy and state surveillance
may arise within a group of otherwise ideologically likeminded
states. NSA’s activities reminded less powerful liberal states that
their ideological interests in the future governance of cyberspace
may not always coincide with those of the USA. In addition, it also
bears noting that different institutional priorities within the states
may complicate their ability to adopt and pursue a single strategic
priority.
6 An updated Code of Conduct was submitted to the Secretary-General in
January 2015, see Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent
Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian
Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General, se A/69/723.
Journal of Cybersecurity, 2019, Vol. 5, No. 1 5
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/cybersecurity/article-abstract/5/1/tyy009/5298865 by Faculty of Life Sciences Library user on 06 M
ay 2019
What now?
Future efforts to agree on how to regulate cyberspace
When seen in a historical perspective, the difficulties by states to
reach broad international agreement on how international law
applies to ICT are not particularly extraordinary. After all, it usually
takes substantial time and effort for states to reach common ground
on how to approach and regulate novel technologies and emerging
means of coercion. This is particularly the case for technologies with
features that challenge existing categories. It is nevertheless tempting
to conclude that the stalemate in the inter-state discussions about
how to govern cyberspace is yet another illustration of how difficult
it has become for the major states to cooperate and agree on legally
binding regulation of issues of major importance to an ever more
interconnected and globalized international society. The rise of
more powerful and assertive states like China, and the comparative-
ly diminishing influence and power of the West, has, after all, led to
an increase in interstate competition and more pronounced rivalry
between the most powerful states about who gets to dictate inter-
national affairs and what the legal norms should be. At present, in
what the UN Secretary-General recently characterized as a
“deteriorating international security environment” where the system
is becoming more multipolar [25], states are loosing the appetite for
embarking on highly ambitious efforts to create legally binding glo-
bal agreements on important contemporary issues. Instead, they opt
for either less ambitious nonbinding global political agreements or
legally binding regional agreement with like-minded states. It is
tempting to strike a parallel between the lack of agreement about
how to govern cyberspace and the developments in international
trade law where little progress has been made since the ninth (and so
far last) round of WTO negotiations was initiated in Doha back in
2001. In their trade relations, states seem to have largely given up
on ambitious global deals and instead seek out regional partners.
Regardless of whether the disagreements among the experts in
the fifth UN GGE reflects a larger pattern or not, it seems likely that
the June 2017 disappointment has put a halt to serious global efforts
to find common ground among all the major powers on how, exact-
ly, ICT should be regulated – at least for the foreseeable future. At
present, states like the USA and China are so powerful in cyber-
space they act as “gatekeepers”, essentially deciding when meaning-
ful international agreement will emerge [1].. Thus, reaching
meaningful international agreement on ICT governance requires
participation from both states and their different strategic ambitions
and worldviews means that we are unlikely to see a uniform legal re-
gime for cyberspace emerge anytime soon.
This, however, does not mean that individual states will just
abandon their roles as “norm entrepreneurs” and stop pushing their
respective views on how ICT should be regulated. Rather, states will
pursue their normative agendas through other processes, before
other fora and by other means.
In a recent process-oriented analysis of cyber-norms, Martha
Finnemore and Duncan Hollis illustrate how the creation of such
norms – whether legally binding or not – is a complex task that
depends on a range of choices about not just the content of the
desired norm but also about the target of the norm and the process
by which the norm will be created [1]. Thus, the debate about the fu-
ture governance of cyberspace concerns not just what the regulation
should look like but also who gets to set the norms and how these
norms will be set.
The attempt to predict what the future has in store vis-a`-vis the
regulation of cyberspace after the collapse of the UN GGE process
can be broken down into distinct expectations about, respectively,
what the main processes and institutions will be, who the primary
protagonists may be, and, finally, what the content of the future
regulation will look like.
Processes and the turn toward regionalization
As noted previously, cyber governance appears to remain a frag-
mented area of international law for the foreseeable future. The lack
of progress before the UN GGE is likely to lead to an increasing
focus on “regional” initiatives with “like-minded” states. In re-
sponse to the June 2017 failure at the UN GGE, an adviser for US
Homeland Security stated that it was now “time to consider other
approaches” and that the USA will “also work with smaller groups
of likeminded partners” and “pursue bilateral agreements when
needed”. So while “not abandoning our multilateral efforts, the
United States will move forward internationally in meaningful bilat-
eral efforts” [26]. As already noted, a range of regional fora already
exists. China and Russia has created the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, which submitted a Code of Conduct for Information
Security to the UN process. In Europe, in 2014 the Council of
Europe adopted the Cyber Crime Convention. In 2016, members of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
established a series of voluntary confidence-building measures
(CBMs) to improve cyber stability, including a mechanism for shar-
ing national cyber strategies and other forms of information [27].
The EU may also begin to more actively seek to fulfill its strategic
ambition of promoting a “rules-based global order” (European
Union Global Strategy) by taking up a more visible role in relation
to the creation of acceptable cyber-norms. The EU already plays an
important role within privacy and data protection and in September
2017, the EU Commission announced a “cybersecurity package”,
including a “Joint Communication on Resilience, Deterrence and
Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU”. On a more prac-
tical day-to-day level, of course, there is already extensive regional
cooperation among national Computer Emergency Response Teams
(CERTs) and Computer Security Incident Response Teams
(CSIRTs).
As a result of the likely turn toward regional fora we are, of
course, likely to see more regional agreements. There are obvious
downsides to such a trend. The overall regulation of ICT may end
up consisting of a range of legal sub-systems of varying normative
depth with the result that different regions develop competing
“silos” of norms [1]. Given the global nature of the Internet, this is
highly unfortunate. A stronger emphasis on regional agreements
may also lead states to abandon efforts to reach more complicated
but also much-needed universal agreement on the regulation of ICT.
There are, however, also advantages to a more regional ap-
proach to cyber regulation. Regional agreements could, for example,
be a way of avoiding time-consuming obstruction of negotiations by
certain state and therefore in all likelihood be a faster way to
“operationalize” certain norms. The expected turn toward regional-
ization may also enable states to cooperate in those areas where they
agree, while remaining in disagreements in others. More selective re-
gional approaches may also enable states to reach agreement on not
just the “low-hanging fruits” but potentially also the more complex
issues that stand in the way of reaching global agreement. Thus, we
could see a shift away from very broad and “shallow” global instru-
ment that have to accommodate the interests of all states toward
more narrow but also “deeper” instruments, which merely have to
take account of the interests of fewer states. Increasing regional co-
operation could also force some states, in particular smaller states,
to consider who their allies actually are in the debate about the
6 Journal of Cybersecurity, 2019, Vol. 5, No. 1
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/cybersecurity/article-abstract/5/1/tyy009/5298865 by Faculty of Life Sciences Library user on 06 M
ay 2019
regulation of cyberspace: what states are “like-minded”? As already
noted, when it comes to strategy, capabilities and ideological prefer-
ences, states often have multiple identities.
Two other “process-trends” are likely to flow from the collapse
of the UN GGE process. First, we may well see more “bilateral
agreements” on ICT, such as the 2015 agreement on commercial es-
pionage between the USA and China. As already noted, the
American efforts to limit Chinese industrial espionage paid of in
September 2015 when then-President Obama signed an agreement
with Chinese President Xi. Under the agreement, neither states’
“government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft
of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential
business information, with the intent of providing competitive
advantages to companies or commercial sectors” [21].
Secondly, we should expect that states begin to try to influence
the discussion about the regulation of cyberspace by unilaterally
stating their legal views and interpretations in official documents
such as national cyber strategies. Over time, such pronouncements
could also help develop international law by consolidating emerging
opinio juris. In March 2018, for example, the British Attorney
General sought to lay out the UK’s position on applying internation-
al law to cyberspace [20].
The increasing role of nonstate actors
The processes listed above all have states as the primary protago-
nists. However, as states struggle to reach common ground, it is like-
ly that various nonstate actors will begin to take on a greater role in
the efforts to bring legal clarity to the regulation of ICT. While it is
true that only states can create legally binding instruments under
international law, nonstate actors can play an important role in the
law-making process [28]. One of the ways nonstate actors can play
a bigger role is by engaging states. Thus, we may well see new col-
laborative initiatives between states and think tanks and research
institutions. A prime example was the so-called “Hague Process”,
where more than 50 states submitted their observations to a draft
version of the second edition of the Tallinn Manual that was pub-
lished in 2017. Another example is the “Global Conference on
Cyber Space” (GCCS), an annual Internet policy event where state
representatives meet up with other actors to engage in discussion
about various issues, including norms for responsible behavior in
cyberspace. The GCCS was initiated to establish internationally
agreed “rules of the road” for behavior in cyberspace and to create a
more focused and inclusive dialogue between all those with a stake
in the Internet. In recent years, we have seen the emergence of a
range of different high-level academic fora that serve as suitable
“vehicles” for the debate about cyber regulation. The “Global
Commission for the Stability of Cyberspace” (GCSC), for example,
was initiated by the Dutch Government in collaboration with The
Hague Center for Strategic Studies and the East-West Institute to de-
velop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international se-
curity and stability and guide responsible state and nonstate
behavior in cyberspace.7
The “tech industry” may also now decide that it should take on
more responsibility for creating an international legal framework
for ICT or at least help establish clear expectations of what is ac-
ceptable state behavior. Certain steps have already been taken. In
December 2014, Microsoft published a paper with six “initial cyber-
security norms” on how states could try to limit conflict in
cyberspace [29]. In July 2016, the tech giant issued a follow-up
paper on how the suggested norms should be implemented [30].
Unlike the 2014 paper, it addressed not only state behavior but also
that of the industry itself. In February 2017, Microsoft proposed a
much-discussed “Digital Geneva Convention” to protect cyber-
space. The purpose of this “Convention” is to “commit” states to
protect “civilians from nation-state attacks in times of peace”.
When presenting its proposal, Microsoft drew parallels to the
ICRC’s active involvement in the Geneva Conventions and stated
how “protection against nation-state cyberattacks requires the ac-
tive assistance of technology companies”. Since the industry “play’s
a unique role as the internet’s first responders”, it should commit to
“collective action that will make the internet a safer place” [31].
Here, reference should also be made to the Cybersecurity Tech
Accords that is a public 2017 commitment by 40 global tech compa-
nies to improve the security, stability and resilience of cyberspace. In
the Accords, the companies not only promise to strive to protect all
users from cyberattacks and to design, develop and deliver products
and services that prioritizes security, privacy, integrity and reliabil-
ity, but also to support civil society, governments and international
organizations in their efforts to advance security in cyberspace and
to build cybersecurity capacity in developed and emerging econo-
mies alike.
Finally, there is the “academic literature”, where the discussions
about how international law applies to activities in cyberspace are
likely to proceed at full throttle. There is already a booming litera-
ture on “cyber-law” and one would expect the many scholarly con-
tributions to have some sort of effect on the future regulation of
ICT. The best examples may well be the two Tallinn Manuals on
international law applicable to cyber-operations pubslihed in 2013
and 2017 respectively.
The content of the regulation
Finally, there is the all-important question of the content of the
desired norms. What should we expect that prescribed behavior in
cyberspace will be? What will states be allowed to do with ICT and
what will they not be allowed to do? Here, two points should be
made. The first is that, as time passes, states are likely to become in-
creasingly comfortable with stating their legal positions about how
cyberspace is – or should be – governed. Most ICTs are fairly novel
inventions and there is still a substantial amount of uncertainty
about the exact nature of the threats in cyberspace. There is also still
fairly little relevant jurisprudence from courts, whether national or
international. But as more harmful cyber incidents take place, more
information about the new technologies becomes available and
courts begin to render decisions, states will find it easier to make the
required legal interpretations. In other words, in the coming years,
in part aided by courts, we should generally expect that more states
become sufficiently comfortable about the new technologies that
they will come down from the fence and state their legal positions.
7 See also East-West Institute, Promoting International Cyber Norms: A
New Advocacy Forum, A report from the EastWest Institute
Breakthrough Group on Promoting Measures of Restraint in Cyber
Armaments, December 2015. https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/slowing-
cyber-arms-race (20 November 2018, date last accessed). In 2014, the
two-year Global Commission on Internet Governance (GCIG) was initi-
ated by the Centre for International Governance Innovation and
Chatham House to make recommendations on the future governance of
the internet, see the overview on https://www.cigionline.org/initiatives/
global-commission-internet-governance (20 November 2018, date last
accessed). The final report of the GCIG was published in June 2016, see
One Internet, 21 June 2016. https://www.cigionline.org/publications/
one-internet (20 November 2018, date last accessed).
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The second point is that, while it may still be too early to predict
how all aspects of ICT will be regulated, the conversation should
begin from the premise that various norms of different character al-
ready exists in cyberspace. As Finnemore and Hollis [1] notes, cyber-
space is not a “blank slate”. For one thing, as we saw in Section 2,
despite its inability to continue the interstate conversation and the
differences about the applicability of international humanitarian
law, the UN GGE process “did” manage to provide some of the
broader answers. Thus, in the third and fourth experts reports the
most important states did go on the official record and stated the
following: (i) that states have jurisdiction over the ICT infrastructure
that is located within their territory; (ii) that the UN Charter applies
in its entirety; (iii) that the principles of sovereign equality and
peaceful settlement of international disputes as well as the prohib-
ition of the use of force, and nonintervention are of central import-
ance; (iii) that states must respect human rights and fundamental
freedoms in cyberspace; (iv) that the same rights that people have
offline are protected online; (v) that states must not use proxies to
commit internationally wrongful acts using ICTs, and should seek to
ensure that their territory is not used by non-State actors to commit
such acts; and (vi) that states must meet their international obliga-
tions regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them
under international law. So, although the concrete task of
“translating” these core principles into concrete rules for ICT
remains fraught with contention, the already established principles
provide a solid point of departure. This was also emphasized by the
Secretary-General in his recent May 2018 “Agenda for
Disarmament” where it was noted that the UN GGE process made
overall progress on, among other things, “norms, rules and princi-
ples of responsible behaviour of States” and that states should im-
plement what was already agreed upon [25].
Finally, of course, there are the many other legal instruments,
technical protocols and best practices that abound in and around
cyberspace. All these instruments also form a basis upon which
states can continue their discussions of how international law should
govern cyberspace.
Conclusion
To understand why the UN GGE process reached a dead-end in
June 2017, one must consider the discussions among the governmen-
tal experts in a wider strategic and ideological context. The debate
about how cyberspace should be regulated is highly politicized and
states are actively pushing norms and legal interpretations that coin-
cide with their strategic and ideological preferences. For time being,
such preferences simply cannot be reconciled. The collapse of the
UN GGE is therefore also a clear indication that we are unlikely to
witness the emergence of a single legal regime for the regulation of
ICT in the foreseeable future. In fact, the June 2017 disappointment
will probably only accelerate the creation of a more regionalized
and fragmented regulation of cyberspace. States’ ICT activities will
therefore continue to be governed by a host of different instruments,
some legally binding and some not. But the stalemate at the UN
does not spell the end of states’ efforts to bring more legal clarity to
the field; it just means they will turn their attention to other fora
and processes. A host of nonstate actors are now likely to begin to
assume a greater role in the continuing debate about law and cyber-
space. While the UN GGE process did not deliver much more than
the most basic of legal finding, it is upon these findings the debate
about the future regulation of ICT should – and will – proceed.
References
1. Finnemore M, Hollis B. Constructing norms for global cybersecurity. Am
J Int L 2016;110:425–79.
2. Finnemore M, Sikkink K. International norm dynamics and political
change’. Int Organ 1998;52:887–917.
3. Henriksen A. Politics and the development of legal norms in cyberspace.
In: Friis K, Ringsmose J (eds), Conflict in Cyber Space: Theoretical,
Strategic and Legal Pespectives. Routledge, 2016, 151–64.
4. Ku J. How China’s views on the law of jus ad bellum will shape its
legal approach to cyberwarfare, 2017. Aegis Series Paper, 1707. https://
www.hoover.org/research/how-chinas-views-law-jus-ad-bellum-will-
shape-its-legal-approach-cyberwarfare (24 November 2018, date last
accessed).
5. Schmitt, MN (ed.). The Tallinn Manual on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Warfare. New York: Cambridge University Press,
2013.
6. Rodriguez M. Declaration by, Representative of Cuba, at the Final
Session of Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field
of Information and Telecommunication in the Context of International
Security, New York, June 23, 2017.
7. Schmitt M, Vihul L. International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN GGE’s
Failure to Advance Cyber Norms, 2017. https://www.justsecurity.org/
42768/international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-
norms/ (24 November 2018, date last accessed).
8. G20 Communique´ Antalya Summit, 15–16 November 2015. https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/16/g20-sum
mit-antalya-communique/ (24 November 2018, date last accessed).
9. G7 Declaration on Responsible States Behavior in Cyberspace, Lucca, 11
April 2017. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000246367.pdf (24 November
2018, date last accesssed).
10. Schmitt, MN (ed). The Tallinn Manual on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Operations. New York: Cambridge University Press,
2017.
11. Xinmin M. Key issues and future development of international cyberspace
law. CQISS 2016;2:119–33.
12. Macak K. From cyber norms to cyber rules: re-engaging states as law-
makers. Leiden J Int L (published online 18 July 2017).
13. Lewis J. Fighting the Wrong Enemy: aka the Stalemate in Cybersecurity,
the Cipher Brief, 2017. https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column/expert-
view/fighting-the-wrong-enemy-aka-the-stalemate-in-cybersecurity (24
November 2018, date last accessed).
14. ICRC, Weapons: Statement of the ICRC to the United Nations, 2017.
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/weapons-statement-icrc-united-
nations-unag-2017 (24 November 2018, date last accessed).
15. Burns WJ, Cohen J. The rules of the brave new cyberworld. Foreign Policy
2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/16/the-rules-of-the-brave-new-
cyberworld/ 24 November 2018; date last accessed).
16. Komov S, Korotkov S, Dylewski I. Military aspects of ensuring internation-
al information security in the context of elaborating universally acknowl-
edged principles of international law. Disarmament Forum 2007;3:35–43.
17. Ford CA. The trouble with cyber arms control. The New Atlantis 2010;
Fall: 52–67.
18. Lotrionte C. A better defense: examining the united states’ new norms-
based approach to cyber deterrence. Georgetown J Int Affairs 2013;14:
75–88.
19. US Explanation of Position, United States Mission to the United Nations,
Explanation of Position at the Conclusion of the 2016-2017 UN Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security, June 23, 2017.
20. UK Attorney General, Speech: Cyber and International Law in the 21st
Century (23 May 2018). https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-
and-international-law-in-the-21st-century (24 November 2018, date last
accessed).
21. Fact Sheet, President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States, 25
September 2015. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
8 Journal of Cybersecurity, 2019, Vol. 5, No. 1
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/cybersecurity/article-abstract/5/1/tyy009/5298865 by Faculty of Life Sciences Library user on 06 M
ay 2019
2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states (24
November 2018, date last accessed).
22. Fitschen T. Statement by Ambassador Dr Thomas Fitschen, Director for
the United Nations, Cyber Foreign Policy and Counter-Terrorism, Federal
Foreign Office of Germany. http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/docu
ments/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com17/statements/23Oct_Germany.pdf
(24 November 2018, date last accessed).
23. Waxman MC. Cyber-attacks and the use of force: back to the future of
article 2(4). Yale J Int L 2011;36:421–59.
24. Center for Democracy and Technology, Consensus Crumbles as Nations
Split on Internet Governance, 2012. https://cdt.org/press/consensus-crum
bles-as-nations-split-on-internet-governance/ (24 November 2018, date
last accessed).
25. UNSG, Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament, 24
May 2018, p. 3–4. https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/
more/securing-our-common-future/ (24 November 2018, date last
accessed).
26. Bossert T. Remarks by Homeland Security Advisor Thomas P. Bossert at
Cyber Week, 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-homeland-security-advisor-thomas-p-bossert-cyber-week-2017/
(24 November 2018, date last accessed).
27. OECD, Decision No. 1202 OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to re-
duce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the use of Information and
Communication Technologies, 10 March 2016. https://www.osce.org/pc/
227281? download¼true (24 November 2018, date last accessed).
28. Boyle A, Chinkin C. The Making of International Law. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2017.
29. Microsoft, International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing conflict in an
Internet-dependent world. December 2014. https://www.microsoft.com/
en-us/cybersecurity/content-hub/reducing-conflict-in-lnternet-dependent-
world (24 November 2018, date last accessed).
30. Microsoft, From Articulation to Implementation: Enabling progress on
cybersecurity norms, June 2016. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cyber
security/content-hub/enabling-progress-on-cybersecurity-norms (24
November 2018, date last accessed).
31. Smith B. The need for a Digital Geneva Convention, 2017. https://blogs.
microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/
(24 November 2018, date last accessed)
Journal of Cybersecurity, 2019, Vol. 5, No. 1 9
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/cybersecurity/article-abstract/5/1/tyy009/5298865 by Faculty of Life Sciences Library user on 06 M
ay 2019
